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ABSTRACT 
we analyze voter preferences for tariffs and production 
subsidies. The distr.Lbution of tax revenues argument shows that 
voters with high direct tax burdens prefer tariffs to subsidies. 
The uncertainty argument demonstrates that if actual tariff and 
subsidy rates are chosen from the set of individually optimal rates 
then the range of tariff rates is smaller than the range of subsidy 
rates. Thus, tariffs might be preferred even though they are less 
efficient. Finally, the large country argument shows that if a 
country is large then voters whose income shares decline with more 
protection prefer tariffs to subsidies . 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
\/hen redistribution of income through commercial policies is considered, 
which instrument is preferred by voters? This question is of particular 
interest in an open economy when the choice is between tariffs and production 
subsidies. 1 Concerning the voters' preferences between these instruments,
Mayer and Riezman (1987) have shown that production subsidies dominate 
tariffs, if peoples' policy preferences are based on differences in factor 
2 ownership. Domination means that every person is better off with a 
production subsidy than a tariff .of the same value, independent of the rate of 
protection. Consequently, one would expect that neither individual voters nor 
policy platforms of politicians call for tariffs. Empirical evidence, 
however, reveals that voters, lobbying groups, and politicians frequently 
favor tariffs over production subsidies, with the primary objective of 
redistributing income. 
A variety of arguments have been suggested to reconcile theory and 
practice. Most frequently mentioned is the transparency argument.3 It states 
that governments prefer tariffs to subsidies because the welfare-reducing 
effects of tariff intervention are less transparent to individuals. People 
are less informed about the cost of a tariff, through a loss in consumer 
surplus, than about the cost of the subsidy, which requires higher taxes to 
finance it. 
Feenstra and Lewis (1990) also focus on incomplete information in
explaining the choice of tariffs. However, it is not the people who are less 
informed than· the goverrunent, but the government has incomplete information
about the losses of individuals from import competition. A nonllnear tariff 
1 
becomes the optimal instrument to protect them. 
An alternative asymmetry assumption is introduced by Rodrik (1986) in
developing what may be called the public goods argument. Tariffs, which
affect a wider grouping of firms, are more of a public good than subsidies, 
which tend to be more firm specific. Consequently, the free rider problem is 
more serious in the case of tariffs and interest groups tend to underpursue 
them. The public, in turn, wants to minimize injury from trade intervention 
and pushes politicians into precommitting to the less damaging tariff regime. 
Wilson (1990) questions the conclusion of Rodrik' s public goods argument 
and suggests that a given politician should prefer subsidies to tariffs since 
the former generate higher political contributions. However, he goes on to 
show that in a political game of several politicians they still may prefer 
tariffs since the game for subsidies leads to excessive protection. 
Staiger and Tabellini (1987) specify a model with fully immobile capital 
and partially immobile labor in which a terms of trade shock occurs. These 
adjustment difficulties prevent the government from precommi tt ing to free 
trade, and tariffs rather than subsidies are likely to be adopted. 
Finally, there is a political process argument, suggested by Nelson 
(1987) and elaborated by Mayer and Riezman (1989) . It postulates that people 
differ with respect to more than one feature, in which case multidimensional 
policy preferences emerge. Even if a tariff is not the ideal point for any 
person, the social choice process still may yield tariffs as the adopted 
instrument. 
This paper introduces three additional arguments to question the 
domination of tariffs by production subsidies at the level of voter 
preferences. The arguments emphasize that the Mayer-Riezman (1987) model,
where voters differ with respect to factor ownership only, represents just one 
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polar case. When tax collection and revenue redistribution systems are no 
longer unbiased, when voters are uncertain about which rates of protection 
will eventually be adopted, and when the choice is restricted to either tariff 
or subsidy in case of a large country, subsidies no longer dominate.4 In each
of the three situations at least some individuals consider tariffs superior to 
production subsidies as an instrument for redistributing income. Given these 
preferences of voters with respect to policy instruments, this also opens the 
possibility that society as a whole will choose tariffs rather than subsidies 
as a regime for protection. 
First, we discuss the distribution of tax revenues argument. It rests on 
the assumption that many income tax systems, on which production subsidies 
draw and to which tariff revenues contribute, are progressive. When a 
person' s tax share is higher than his or her income share, tariffs reduce the 
individual' s direct tax burden while subsidies. raise it. There exists an 
asymmetry with respect to cost, as the cost of a subsidy ls borne by a small 
group of upper-income people while the cost of the tariff, in terms of lost 
consumer surplus, is spread across the whole population. 
Second, there is the uncertainty argument. It deals with situations 
where people must express their preferences for a policy regime, such as 
tariffs or subsidies, be fore they know which rates will actually be adopted. 
It is shown that the potential range of rates is narrower for tariffs than 
subsidies, under the assumption that actual rates are chosen from the set of 
individually optimal rates. This implies that individuals consider a tariff 
regime to be less efficient, but also less risky than a production subsidy 
regime, and t�e less risky tariff regime may be preferred. 
Finally, there is the l arge country argument. As was indicated in Mayer
and Riezman (1987), when a country has control over the terms of trade, each
3 
pePson likes a combination of tapiffs and subsidies. All people want the same 
tapiff Pate to exploit the countpy' s monopoly position, but individually 
optimal subsidy Pates diffeP depending on factoP ownepship. He Pe, we deal 
with the mope Pealistic situation that people have to choose between eitheP 
tapiffs OP subsidies, excluding the possibility of a combination of the two. 
It is shown that all people whose income shapes decline with mope pPotection 
of the impoPt industpy pPefeP tapiffs to subsidies. Even gainePs fPom the 
ppotective measUPes may be betteP off with the tapiff. 
II. REAL INCOME UNDER TARIFFS ANO SUBSIDIES 
The economy undeP considepation is assumed to consist of I Pisk-neutpal
individuals who possess homothetic, identical pPefePences, but diffep fpom 
each otheP with Pespect to theiP fixed factop endowments. These diffepences 
in factoP ownePship ape the undeplying cause fop peoples' diffepences in 
policy pPefePences. Thepe ape two factoPS of pPoduction which ape employed by 
two competitive industPies pPoduclng commodities x1 and Xz· 
othePwlse, the economy undep considePation is small. 
Unless stated 
Fop the Pisk-neutPal 1th pePson, welfape is measUPed by Peal income, 
(1) i i i R = y die (p),
i whePe yd ls disposable income of individual 1, p is the domestic pPice of the
second in tePms of the fiPst commodity as faced by consumePS, and ei = e ls a 
pPice index which, undep \dent ically homothet le pPefepences, is the same fop 
al l consumeps. 
4 
D� is the ith consumer' s demand for the second commodity.
The second commodity, whose world price is rr, is imported. Under a 
production subsidy, domestic consumers face this world price. Under a tariff, 
on the other hand, the price becomes: 
( 2) p = rr( 1 + t), 
where t is an ad valorem tariff rate on the import good. Disposable income of
i i the ith person, yd' is income received from factor ownership, y , adjusted for 
i redistributed tariff revenues received, i: , or taxes paid to finance the 
isubsidy, o-
(3) and i 0- • 
where subscripts t and s refer to the tariff and subsidy regimes respectively. 
It is convenient to define the 1th person' s share of total factor income 
by �i = yi/Y and the shares of total tariff revenues received by�� = i;i/T and
i i of subsidies financed by �s = o- IS. In these expressions, Y = (X1 + pX2J is
national income produced (total factor income earned), X. denotes industry
J 
output of commodity j, T = xt!D2(p) - �(pl] = rl�(p) is total tariff
revenues, S = ns�[n(l + s)] measures total subsidy payments, D2Cp) is total 
domestic demand, and �(p) expresses import demand for good two at domestic
price p. Using the share definitions, we express the ith person's real income
under a tariff and subsidy regime respectively as: 
5 
(4) 
(5) .pi )S]/e(rr). s 
Each person's real income is proportionate to real national income, R, after
it has been adjusted by a term which reflects the divergence between factor 
income and tax shares, whereby real national income under tariff and subsidy 
respectively are: 
Rt = (Yt + T)/e(pl and R = (Y - Sl/e(rrl. s s 
i i We finally note that, at t = s of a small country, Yt = Ys' �t = �s' and (Yt + 
Tl = (Ys - S + rrtD2l = [Ys - S]/[1 - m2tl(l + tl], where m2(p) = pD2/ (Yt + Tl 
is the marginal and average propensity to consume the second good under a 
tariff. 
Ill. THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAX REVENUES ARGUMENT 
The purpose of this section is to show that in a small economy a person 
may be better off under a tariff than equal-value production subsidy if the 
person' s shares of taxes paid and of tariff revenues received exceed the share 
5 of factor income. In many less developed countries in which a large segment
of below-average income people pays no or very little income tax, these 
conditions are likely to be encountered. 
We assume that initially, when protection of the import industry is 
considered, free trade prevails. At issue is whether the !th person will fare 
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better with a tariff or an equal-value production subsidy; that is, whether R� 
i is greater or smaller than R , given that t = s. s Using the earlier stated 
definitions of real national income, Rt and Rs' we subtract (5) from (4) and
obtain: 
(6) = ¢
i
[R - R ]  + [¢i - ¢
i](T/e(p) + S/e(rr)], t s 
where we set ¢i = ¢i = ¢i and for simplicity' s sake assume that ¢i = ¢i = ¢i.6t s t s 
The ith person' s real income change from selecting a tariff rather than 
production subsidy depends on two effects. First, there is the real income 
change for the entire country weighted by the person' s factor income share. 
Second, there is the real value of government savings, as it replaces an 
expenditure-causing subsidization policy by a revenue-generating tariff 
policy, when weighted by the difference between the person' s tax and income 
shares. Clearly, the second effect is positive (negative) if the ith person' s 
tax share is high (low) relative to his or her factor income share. 
An interpretation of (Rt - Rs) can be given for situations where policy
changes are large. Recalling that Rt = [Yt + Tl/e(p) and Rs = [Ys - S]/e(rr),
where Yt = Ys for s = t, and writing e(p) = e(rr) + Ae, we obtain:
(7) Rt - Rs = {T + S - [Ys - S](Ae/e(rr)]}/e(p) = [T + S - R Ae]/e(p),s 
where the change in price index, Ae, is due to a tariff which, starting from a 
free trade position, can be expressed as (.<l.e/Ap)1lt. For large tariffs, the 
index change is approximated by: 
(8) 
7 
where we average the price index responses in the neighborhood of initial and 
new consumption points respectively. Since e (lf) = o2(n:)/R and e (pl = p s p 
(9) 
Substitution of (T + SJ = n:tD2(p), when t = s, and of (9) in (7),and using m2
= [n:( 1 + tJD2(p) ]/(Rte(p) l. yields:
( 10) R - R t s
which is always negative since D2(p) < D2(lf) for p > n: and 1 > m2tl(2 + 2t).
Consequently, no matter what the rate's value·, protection of an industry 
through a tariff makes the nation as a whole always worse off than protection 
through an equal-rate production subsidy. 
Knowing that Rt < Rs always, we now return to (6) to draw the following
conclusions concerning the ith person's welfare effects of a tariff relative 
to a production subsidy: 
1. If the tax system is unbiased, ln the sense that tax shares are the same 
as income shares, a production subsidy is preferred by every individual 
independent of factor ownership. This reaffirms the result that tariffs 
are dominated by subsidies. 
2. If the tax system is biased such that some peoples' tax shares exceed
their income shares, they may find tariffs to be superior to production 
subsidies as an instrument of protection. The superiority of tariffs is
more likely the greater the difference between tax and income shares. 
8 
The distribution of tax revenues argument rests on the assumption that a 
country's tax system is such that high-income groups have tax shares which 
exceed their factor income shares. When high-income people consider 
protect ion, they realize that a tariff generates revenues whose distribution 
would be of primary benefit to them, while production subsidies require higher 
taxes which fal 1 on them disproportionately. Looked at the two instrument• s
cost side, subsidization translates into higher income taxes for upper income 
groups, while tariff costs, in form of reduced consumer surplus, are 
7 distributed much more evenly across the population. The argument, therefore,
involves an asymmetry concerning the identity of cost bearers; subsidy costs 
fall on a small group of high income tax payers, while tariff costs are borne 
by all consumers of the import good. 
IV. THE UNCERTAINTY ARGUMENT 
This argument rests on the assumption that the voters' choice between 
employment of a tariff or subsidy regime has to be made before actual rates of 
protection are to be selected. For example, in a two-candidate race for 
political office, candidates may express positions only on the type of 
instrument but not on the rates to be chosen. What we are going to show is 
that under this uncertainty about future rates of protection many voters,
especially those with moderate preferences for or against protection, may 
prefer a tariff to a subsidy regime. In presenting the argument, we assume 
that there is.no bias in distributing tariff revenues or collecting taxes to 
finance the subsidy; that is, we assume that I/Ii = .;i. 
The uncertainty argument rests on the assU11ption that the probability of 
9 
a given rate of protection getting adopted equals the fraction of people which 
considers this rate to be best. 8 The probability that rate of protection x 
will be adopted is expressed by f(x, tl and f(x, s) for the alternatives of 
tariff and subsidy regime respectively. i i If we define R (x, t) and R (x, s) as 
the ith person's welfare under tariff and subsidy regimes when rate x 
prevails, then the person's expected utility under a tariff regime is higher 
than under a subsidy regime if: 
( 11) 
. x i x i B
1 
= fR (x, t) dF(x, tl - fR (x,s)dF(s,t) > 0, 
x x 
where F(x, . )  is the cumulative distribution function under a given policy 
regime and x and � are the finite limits on the rates of protect ion under
el ther pol icy regime. The values of x and � are given by the highest and
lowest individually optimal rates of protection from all the people of the 
country. 
To evaluate B1, we first add and subtract
x i SR (x,sldF(x,t) to obtain:
x 
(12) · 
x 
l l 
x i B
1 
= J[R (x, t) - R (x,s)]dF(x,t) - fR (x, s)[dF(x,s) - dF(x,t)].
x x 
The first term on the RHS of (12) must always be negative when �l = �i since
we know from (6) that R1(x,t) s Ri(x,s) for all x, with equality holding at x 
= O only. This term measures the expected loss in utility due to a switch
from a subsidy to a 
employed as weights. 
tariff regime when the probabilities of tariff rates are 
iHence, a necessary condition for B to become positive
is that the second term on the RHS of ( 12), including the minus sign, is
positive. 
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(13) 
Using integration by parts, this second term can be rewritten as: 
x i x l-JR (x, s) [dF(x, s) - dF(x, tll = JR' (x, s) (F(x, s) - F(x, t) ]dx, 
x x 
where R' 1 (x, s) is the marginal utility of a subsidy change.
9 
For a person 
whose utility maximizing rate is xi, the term R' iis positive for x < x < x1,
l -l -whereas R' ls negative for x < x < x. What we are going to show ls that the
expression in (13) must always be positive for a voter whose optimal policy ls 
free trade, as the distribution F (x, t) dominates F(x, sJ10 in the first-order 
stochast le sense. For voters whose optimal rate of protect ion deviates from
free trade the value of this expression becomes smaller with the degree of 
deviation. 
First-order stochastic dominance of F(x, t) over F(x, sl ls due to the fact 
that each person' s optimal tariff rate, whether positive or negative, is 
always less extreme that the same person' s optimal subsidy rate. In order to 
show this, we rewrite (4) and (5) under the assumption that �i = �i. as: 
( 4. ) 
(5' ) 
where p = tt{l + t) = tt( 1 + s). The responses of real income to tariff and 
subsidy rate changes are: 
(14) 
(15) 
11 
where � = (D2 - X2l is import demand, (B�/Bp) < 0, (BX21ap) > 0, and 
(B<l>i /Bp) measures the change in the ith person's factor income share as the
second good's domestic price rises. Both real income responses reveal that a 
person can gain from an increase in either tariff or subsidy rate only if his 
factor income share rises as the domestic price of the import good goes up. 
Figure 1 portrays the real income curves for two alternative persons, a winner 
from protect ion indicated by superscript w and a loser from protection with 
superscript L. i i The R (t) curve is uniformly below the R (s) curve except for
the free trade point, where s = t = 0. Assuming that the second order 
conditions for a maximum are satisfied, the ith individual maximizes real 
-i income by choosing a subsidy rate s such that: 
( 16) -i i i s = [ (Ys - S)(B<I> /Bp) ]/['Ir</> (aX2/Bp)].
Clearly, the optimal subsidy rate is positive for a winner from protection, 
since B<l>w/Bp > 0, and negative for a loser, as B<l>L/Bp < 0. But what is the
slope of the R
1
(t) locus at tariff rate t = si? If one can show that it is
-w -w negative at s , then the individually optimal tariff rate t occurs at a lower
-w value than s , as drawn in the 
L -L -L R (t) ls positive at s then s 
diagram for the winner. And if the slope of
< tL < O. In demonstrating this we note again 
that, at a given rate x, Ys = Yt and (B�/Bp) is the same under both regimes.
Then, we recall that (Yt + Tl = (Y5 - S)/[1 - �t/(1 + t)]. Substituting (16)
for t and the expression for (Yt + T) in (14), one can see after some
manipulations that: 
12 
a1'csJ 
(t) 
-L s 0 
FIGURE 1 
x 
-w 
t 
-w s 
(17) = 
{rr[Ys - SJ [8</>
i /8p]}{ (8D218p) [ifC8X218p)}
e(p)[l - m2tl(l + t)] 
where (8D2/ap) lu < 0 is the pure substitution effect of the own price change. 
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This implies that, evaluated at t = �i. aR�/at < O if 8¢1/Bp > O and 8R�/8t > 
O if 8¢1/8p < 0. In words, for people who gain (lose) from protection, real
income under the tariff regime is already (still) decreasing (increasing) at 
the rate where the optimal production subsidy is attained. This means that 
the optimal import tariff rate is lower than the optimal production subsidy 
rate for gainers from protection, while the optimal import subsidy (implying a 
negative value for t) falls short of the optimal product ion tax for losers 
-i -i -i -i from protection; that ls, s < t < 0 for all people with x < 0 and 0 < t < 
-i -i s for all people with x > 0. 
The fact that the range of individually optimal tariff rates around the 
free trade point is narrower than the range of subsidy rates furthermore 
implies that: 
[F(x,s) - F(x,t)] > 0 for x < 0 
(18) 
[F(x,s) - F(x,t)] < 0 for x > 0,
given our assumption that the probability of a certain rate of protection 
being adopted equals the fraction of the population which considers this rate 
to be opt !mal. As we examine the case of a person whose optimal policies
-1 favor free trade, x = 0, such that R'i > O for x < 0 and R'1 < 0 for x > 0,
one can see from (18) that 
(19) 
i ) 
-
R' (x,s)[F(x,s) - F(x,t l > 0
13 
always. Hence, the expression of (13) is positive and the second term in 
(12), which states the expected utility gain from a subsidy to tariff switch, 
is positive. Provided the second terms' magnitude is sufficient to outweigh 
the negative first term in the Bi expression, the person will favor a tariff
regime. 
The case for preferring a tariff regime under uncertainty is weakened 
when the person's optimal subsidy rate under certainty is not zero. For 
example, 
as: 
(13' ) 
-i -i let us consider the case when x = s > 0. 
0 i JR' [F(x,sl - F(x,t)]dx + 
-i x i JR' [F(x,sl 
x 0 
x i +JR' [F(x,sl - F(x,t)]dx , 
-ix 
Then one can rewrite (13)
-F(x,t)]dx 
where R'i > O for x < x-i and R'i < O for x >xi> 0. Using (18), one can see
that the first and last terms in (13') are still positive while the second
term becomes negative. The more extreme the optimal subsidy for the 
individual under consideration, the larger is the impact of this middle
relative to the last term and the less likely it is that the person prefers a
tariff regime. 
Figure 2 provides a simple illustration of the possibility that a person 
prefers a tariff to a subsidy regime when rates of protection are not known 
yet. It ls assumed that individual i believes that actual trade policy is
going to be dictated either by those who strongly favor protection of the
second industry, with t and s as their optimal respective rates, or by those
who strongly favor assistance to the first industry, implying � and � as their
14 
E(Ri 
i 
E(R9 s 
Ri 
t 
--�'--�..:,._����--1�....1...������_J_�_!_� x 
0 E(t) t s 
E(s) 
FIGURE 2. 
choices. Assuming subjective probabilities of 1/2 for each possible outcome, 
the ith person's real income at the expected subsidy rate E(s) exceeds real 
income at the expected tariff rate E(t). However, expected real income under 
the tariff regime, is larger than expected real income under the 
subsidy regime, E(Ri), making individual i prefer the tariff regime. s 
V. THE LARGE COUNTRY ARGUMENT 
The earlier made assertion that, at each rate of protection and for each 
individual, a production subsidy leads to a higher level of welfare than a 
tariff applies only to the case when world prices are fixed. The purpose of 
this section is to show that, with variable world prices, all people whose 
factor income shares shrink with import protection prefer a tariff to a 
subsidy. Even people whose income shares rise in response to protective 
action may prefer tariffs to subsidies. 
Under variable world prices, equal-valued tariffs and subsidies no 
longer result in the same domestic prices as faced by producers. The decrease 
in world excess demand for the second good is larger when a tariff is imposed 
than when an equal-value subsidy is granted, as can be seen from 
differentiation of the import functions, HzCsl and HzCtl, under subsidy and
tariff respectively, where: 
(20) 
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These differentiations, assuming that initially s = t = 0, yield: 
( 21) and 
The import response expression tell us that, evaluated at the initial world 
price, the dee! ine in world excess demand for the import good is greater in 
case of a tariff than a subsidy. Consequently, world and domestic prices of 
the import good will be lower under a tariff than an equal-value subsidy; that 
is: 
(22) rr(s) > rr(t) and p(s) > p(t) for s = t. 
A second consideration under variable world prices is that each person's 
optimal instrument use involves now a combination of a tariff and production 
subsidy rather than use of only one instrument. Independent of factor 
ownership, all people are in full agreement that the same tariff rate, namely 
the one which maximizes social welfare for a large country, should be 
employed. On the other hand, the accompanying optimal subsidy depends on 
12 relative factor ownership. 
In a situation of instrument choice, a person is not given the option of 
combining the two instruments. Each individual has to express a preference 
for either tariffs or subsidies. It is obvious that neither instrument is 
preferred at all rates and by all people to the other instrument. Some may 
like tariffs better while others prefer production subsidies. Broadly 
speaking, however, there exists a bias towards tariffs, as all people whose 
income shares decline with import protection are better off with a tariff for 
a large range of protection rates, and even some people whose income shares 
16 
expand in response to protection are better served by a tariff. 
To show this, we express the ith individual's real income under 
instrument use k = t, s as: 
(23) 
it l cf>!. Instrument use affects both where is assumed that � = income share, 
i <f>k' and real national income, �· The latter is maximized when the chosen 
instrument is a tariff and the rate which ls optimal for the whole country, t 
= 1/(c* - 1), is employed, where c• ls the import elasticity of demand for the 
foreign country. Furthermore, one can show that real national income under 
the tariff regime, Rt' ls larger than real national income under the subsidy 
13 regime, R , for a wide range of rates of protection. s 
The rel at lonshlp between a person's income share under a tariff and 
equal-value subsidy, on the other hand, depends on whether the person is a 
gainer or loser from protection. We first look at people whose income shares 
are reduced by import protection. As they consider the choice between tariffs 
and subsidies, tariffs result in smaller losses in income shares, since p(t) < 
i l p(s) implies that (8¢s/8p)(8p/8s) < (8¢t/8p)(8p/8tl < o for all s = t > o. 
For individuals whose income shares rise with the adoption of protective 
measures, on the other hand, the gains in income shares are more pronounced in 
the case of a production subsidy since (8¢1/8p)(8p/8s) > (8¢1/8p)/(8p/8t) > o. 
Returning to (23), we now examine which instrument ls preferred by a 
gl ven person. If the person's income share is reduced by import protection 
then, except for some very high rates, Rt > Rs and <flt > <f>s for t = s > 0. 
Consequently, 'losers' from protection are better off with the tariff than the 
subsidy. If, the person's income share rises with import protection then, 
17 
except for very high rates, Rt > Rs but <l>t 
< <l>s for t = s > 0. Hence,
'gainers' from protect ion are better off with a tariff only if the tariff 
advantage in raising national income is not offset by the tariff disadvantage 
in raising one's income share. This ls more likely to be the case for small 
rather than large gainers from protection. 
VI. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE TRANSPARENCY ARGUMENT 
Incomplete information is at the core of the transparency argument. The 
argument states that the public can more easily be persuaded to accept a 
tariff than product ion subsidy since the detrimental ramifications of the 
latter are more transparent. The reason for this asymmetry in transparency 
is, however, not easy to pinpoint. Intuitively, one can argue that tariffs 
work in a more complicated way than subsidies. In particular, the former 
require an assessment of how much consumer surplus a person loses while the 
latter deals with the simpler task of figuring out how much more taxes have to 
be paid to finance the subsidy. Not only understand people the impact of 
subsidies better than of tariffs, but they will receive clearer messages from 
14news services and politicians about the costs of these instrument uses. 
Let us examine the essence of the transparency argument with more rigor. 
We return to the earlier made assumption of a small country and employ (4)-(5)
to express the ith person's real income under tariff and subsidy respectively, 
assuming that factor income and tax shares are identical; that is, R! = .;i!cvt
+ T)/e(p) and Ri = <i>i(Y - S)/e(n). Now let us assume that the ith person is . s s s 
not sure how, starting from an initial free trade position, the tariff would 
affect his price index e(p). On the other hand, there would be no change in 
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e(n:) under a subsidy. This uncertainty under the tariff has the fol lowing 
imp! icat ions for the choice of instruments. As Figure 3 illustrates, Ri is
i i convex in the price index, whereby Rt lies uniformly abcve Rs since (Yt + Tl > 
(Y - S) and beth disposable incomes are evaluated at the same level of e.s 
For a subsidy, real income at e(n:) would be R1[e(n:) ] which is larger than reals 
l income with an equal value tariff which amounts to Rt [e(p) 1. When e(p) is 
random, however, then it ls possible that E{R�[e(p) ]} > R![e(n:) ] since, using 
Jensen's inequality, E[l/e(p) ] > 1/E[e(p) ]. In the diagram this is 
illustrated for the case where the person attaches probabilities of 1/2 to the 
possible price indices of e 1 1µ1d e2. The person would prefer a tariff with
!ts unclear effect on consumer surplus over a subsidy with its much more 
tra..�sparent cost. 
Unfortunately, the abcve presented reasoning ls flawed. The assumption 
that people have difficulty ln evaluating the price index under the new tariff 
rate must rest on the premise that people do not know with certainty what 
their consumption demand would be at the tariff-ridden domestic price. As
Dreze ( 1974) , however, points out in his discussion of the foundations of 
expected uti 11 ty theory, "uncertainty of the decision-maker abcut his own 
tastes at a future date cannot be described through distinct events 
corresponding to distinct preference structures, since this would violate the 
condition of interpersonal objectivity. " 
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VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The starting point for this paper was the observation that, with factor 
ownership the only distinguishing characteristic, tariffs are dominated by 
product ion subsidies from an individual's point of view. We added to the 
growing list of arguments in support of individual preferences for tariffs by 
allowing for biased income tax systems, by introducing uncertainty about what 
rates will actually come about, and by doing away with the small country 
assumption when choice is restricted to one instrument. The objective of the 
paper was to show that under each of these modifications individuals may 
indeed express a preference for tariffs. We have talked about individual 
preferences only and do not want to leave the impression that a given argument 
automatically explains the social choice of tariffs. One has to add a 
complete specification of the political process .to explain the social choice. 
However, one could show that for appropriate choices of voter eligibility 
rules, majority voting can bring about a tariff regime as the social choice 
under each of the three arguments presented. 
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FOOTNOTES 
Other, potenti ally more effici ent, i nstruments, such as lump-sum transfers 
and factor i ncome taxes are precluded by assumpti on. 
Thi s proposi ti on at the i ndi vi dual's level corresponds to the more basi c 
proposi ti on at soci ety's level that subsi di es are better than tari ffs i n  
correcti ng domesti c di storti ons, as demonstrated by Bhagwatl and Ramaswami 
(1963) and Bhagwatl (1971). 
Hi llman (1989) di scusses the essence of the argument and refers to i ts role 
i n  the hi story of Australi an tari ff formati on. 
Thi s breakdown of subsi dy domi nati on at the level of i ndi vi dual voters i s
si mi lar to the breakdown of the fi rst-best producti on subsi dy argument at 
the level of a benevolent government, when there are not just production 
di storti ons but also government revenue constrai nts (Carden, 1986, pp. 96 -
101), uncertainty (Eaton and Grossman, 1985), revenue-seeki ng by 
i ndi vi duals or groups (Bhagwati , Brecher, and Srini vasan, 1984), or 
non-economi c objecti ves (Johnson, 1965 and Bhagwati and Sri ni vasan, 1969). 
It i s  expli ci tly assumed that the choi ce between tari ffs and subsi di es i s
made gi ven the exi sti ng i ncome tax system. The model does not explai n how 
the i ncome tax structure has come about and how preferences vari ous 
taxes would be determi ned i f  the enti re tax structure were to be 
determi ned. 
Thi s si mpli fi cation does not affect the argument i n  any fundamental way. 
In reall ty l t may not be the case that consumer surplus shri nks i n
proporti on to a person's i ncome, as preferences may not be i denti cal and 
homothetlc. In less developed countri es, the share of income spent on 
i mported goods frequently ls larger for upper-i ncome than lower-i ncome 
groups. In such a case, the di stri buti on of tax revenues argument would be 
·weakened.
Nothi ng ls sai d about the politi cal process i tself through whi ch the rate
ls chosen, as even thi s process may not be known yet. Loosely speaki ng,
the assumpti on states that a person consi ders a certai n rate of protecti on
more li kely the more people look at i t  as thei r best rate.
Note that F(�.t) = F(�,s) = 0 and F(x,t) = F(x,s) = 1.
See Laffont (1989) for defi ni ti ons of stochasti c dominance. 
In deri vi ng thi s expressi on we made use of a�1ap = aolap - 8Xz18 p = 
[(802/BplJu - CBXzlBp)]/[l - m2t/(l + t)].
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For more details see Mayer and Riezman (1987) and references therein. 
As long as the rate of protection is less than the socially optimal tariff 
rate, real national income under a tariff is at least as large as under a 
production subsidy. This can be seen by adding a consumption tax to a 
preexisting production subsidy and evaluating the overall welfare change. 
For very high rates of protection beyond the socially optimal tariff rate, 
however, it is possible that real national income under the subsidy is 
higher than under the tariff. 
The real complicated question, 
affects the factor income of 
namely how a given rate of protection 
individuals under different protection 
instruments, does not enter the comparison since in a small country a 
person's factor income, whatever its value, would be the same under beth 
tariff and subsidy of the same value. 
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